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Boards Of Directors Under Fire: An
Examination of Nonprofit Board Duties in
the Health Care Environment
Naomi Ono*
INTRODUCTION
The era of deference toward boards of directors is over. In
recent years, the actions of boards of directors have come under
increased scrutiny and the fiduciary duty doctrines have been
reinforced. The proliferation of lawsuits brought by attorneys
general against directors of various organizations demonstrates
the states' willingness to examine director conduct. Nowhere is
this more evident than in the health care field, where a rapidly
changing environment is compelling directors to face increas-
ingly demanding and challenging responsibilities. The recent ex-
pansion of federal and state regulation, combined with the
growing complexity of business transactions, has increased lia-
bility exposure for nonprofit organizations and their directors.
Several investigations of nonprofit health care organizations'
boards of directors have been brought in the past few years by
attorneys general alleging that directors breached their fiduciary
duties.1
Traditionally, the hospital industry has largely comprised non-
profit, tax-exempt hospitals that have played a tremendous role
in the furnishing and delivery of health care services. However,
this sector has undergone astounding transformations as health
care entities evolve from stand-alone facilities to consolidated
delivery systems. At the same time, alterations are being made
to the nonprofit status of some of these entities. These evolu-
tionary changes in the way health care delivery systems are be-
ing structured and regulated require board members to confront
* Ms. Ono is an associate with the law firm of Riordan & McKinzie in Costa
Mesa, California where she practices in the health law group. She received her Bach-
elor of Science from the University of Southern California, her Juris Doctor, magna
cum laude, from Pepperdine University School of Law, and her Master of Laws in
Health Law from Loyola University Chicago School of Law. The author would like
to thank Professor Lawrence Singer for his review and comments. She would also
like to thank her family for their unyielding love and support.
1. See infra notes 165-179 and accompanying text.
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a myriad of issues that inevitably arise under distinct factual
scenarios.
Board members of nonprofit health care organizations are
bound not only by the general laws governing corporate direc-
tors, but they must also adhere to the state and federal laws that
regulate the health care industry in particular. Under both the
general and health care specific rules, the directors' primary re-
sponsibilities are to adhere to their fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty. Recent case law and federal regulations expand and
clarify directors' fiduciary duties. The decision in In re
Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation2 requires
boards of directors, in fulfilling their fiduciary duties, to be re-
sponsible for ensuring that adequate information and reporting
systems exist which facilitate in uncovering and responding to
employee misconduct. Caremark illustrates the Delaware
Chancery Court's willingness to impose stringent requirements
on boards of directors in areas in which courts previously de-
ferred to boards' discretion.4 The duty of boards to monitor the
affairs of the corporation on whose board they serve has been
amplified by the United States Sentencing Commission's pro-
mulgation of Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations. 5
The guidelines permit the imposition of significantly reduced
sanctions for organizations convicted of criminal wrongdoing if
those organizations have adopted "an effective program to pre-
vent and detect violations of law."' 6 The availability of reduced
penalties in cases where an organization is convicted of a crime
serves as a strong incentive for boards to implement effective
compliance programs.
In addition, the threat of individual liability may induce board
members to perform their fiduciary duties in an appropriate
manner. The Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2,7 signed into law by Pres-
ident Clinton on July 30, 1996, may be applied specifically to
boards of directors of health care organizations. This legislation
allows the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") to hold individual
directors and managers of tax-exempt corporations accountable
for fraud and abuse in health care systems through the imple-
2. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
3. See id. at 969-70.
4. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
5. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 (1995).
6. Id. § 8C2.5(f).
7. See Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, §§ 1311-14, 110 Stat. 1452,
1475-81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1996)).
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mentation and imposition of excise taxes on "excess benefit
transactions." 8 Therefore, the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 pro-
vides directors who may be held personally liable for the pay-
ment of exise taxes an additional incentive to fulfill their
fiduciary duties.
Affiliations between nonprofit health care entities and for-
profit organizations is another topic engendering much discus-
sion. Such transactions have generated concerns among attor-
neys general and the communities the nonprofit entities serve
regarding the proper distribution of charitable health care serv-
ices and resources. Upon the dissolution or conversion of non-
profit entities, boards of directors must be cognizant of
charitable trust laws which require nonprofit corporations to
dedicate their assets to specified charitable purposes.9 Further,
boards of directors must be aware that several states, concerned
with the conversion of nonprofit health care entities to for-profit
entities, have enacted legislation mandating government ap-
proval prior to consummation of particular transactions.10
The purpose of this Article is to illustrate the application of
fiduciary duty principles to directors of nonprofit health care
corporations in a health care environment that is changing at
unprecedented rates. Part I reviews general corporate law, dis-
cusses the basic duties imposed upon board members in the
health care context, and demonstrates the application of the
board's fiduciary duties to factual scenarios using case exam-
ples. 1 Part I also discusses the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 in de-
tail and offers suggestions to assist in protecting directors against
the imposition of excess benefit penalties.12 Part II analyzes the
recent Caremark case and its effect on director liability with re-
spect to corporate compliance systems. 13 An examination of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines complements the conclu-
sion reached in Caremark.14 Part III expands on basic nonprofit
corporate law doctrines and addresses some of the issues boards
must confront in nonprofit conversions.15 The Article concludes
8. See id.
9. See IVA AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, Sco-rr
ON TRUSTS § 348.1 (4th ed. 1989).
10. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 17-81 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 82-103 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 107-112 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 113-144 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 145-179 and accompanying text.
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by discussing California legislation as an illustration of the
states' attempts to regulate nonprofit conversions.16
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Board members of nonprofit, tax-exempt health care organi-
zations are governed by a variety of state and federal laws. The
most prevalent of those laws are those that require directors to
fulfill their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.
A. Directors' Fiduciary Duties
The concept of fiduciary duties is embedded in corporate law.
Until relatively recently, the actions of nonprofit boards of di-
rectors were rarely challenged by attorneys general on fiduciary
duty grounds. Some authors suggest that directors of nonprofit
corporations have been protected from liability because of the
deference accorded them in light of the corporations' nonprofit
status.'7 This perception is due in part to the fact that nonprofit
corporations typically have boards of directors that comprise
members who serve on a voluntary basis.18 Several states have
enacted assorted statutes providing volunteers of nonprofit or-
ganizations with a limited form of statutory immunity which in-
sulates the volunteers from individual liability.' 9 In addition, the
parties that have standing to challenge the actions of directors of
nonprofit corporations are generally limited to the members of
the board, the corporate members, and the state's attorneys gen-
eral.20 Attorneys general have, until recently, lacked the ability
16. See infra notes 181-189 and accompanying text.
17. See Eric S. Tower, Directors' Duty to Obtain a Fair Price in the Conversion of
Nonprofit Hospitals, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 157, 167 (1997) (citing HOWARD L.
OLECK & MARTHA E. STEWART, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND
ASSOCIATIONS 889, 889 (1994) and Michael Peregrine, Doing "Big Deals" and the
Board's Duty of Care, 28 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 327, 327 (1995)); see also DANIEL L.
KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 23, 99 (1988) (noting
that a number of states have enacted legislation shielding uncompensated directors of
charitable corporations from liability to third persons).
18. The voluntary basis on which directors of nonprofit corporations serve is dis-
tinguished from their counterparts in for-profit organizations in which the directors
are often highly compensated business leaders.
19. See David James Bush, Comment, The Constitutionality of the Charitable Im-
munity and Liability Act of 1987, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 657, 662 n.41 (1988).
20. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MODEL NONPROFIT LAW, AMERICAN BAR Asso-
CIATION, REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT §§ 1.70, 3.04, 6.30 (1987)
[hereinafter "RMNCA"]. Although the RMNCA has not been expressly adopted by
all states, several of its provisions are similar to those implemented by many states
and provide valuable guidance to the nonprofit corporate law analysis.
[Vol. 7
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to adequately supervise nonprofit corporations because of the
scarcity of financial resources. 21  Further, although boards of
nonprofit organizations are accountable to the public, often
there is little public oversight.22
Although the law historically grants deference to directors of
nonprofit corporations based on their volunteer status and the
perception that they will act in the public interest, their conduct
is governed by the same corporate standards as directors of for-
profit corporations. 23 Nonprofit directors serve as fiduciaries
and are responsible for fulfilling unyielding fiduciary obligations
to both the corporation and the public at large.24 The two bed-
rock fiduciary duties are the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.
1. The Duty of Care
The duty of care mandates that a director act in good faith, in
a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would reasonably be expected
to exercise under similar circumstances.2 5 The duty of care re-
quires members of boards to inform themselves of all material
facts necessary to reach reasoned decisions.26
The propriety of director actions is governed by the business
judgment rule.27 The business judgment rule creates a legal pre-
21. See James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an
Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 669 (1985).
22. See id. at 677-78. However, this contention is being diminished by state offi-
cials and lawmakers who are responding to the changing nature of health care deliv-
ery through the proposal and enactment of laws which specifically regulate nonprofit
health care organizations. See id. at 680-83.
23. See RMNCA, supra note 20, § 8.30. The primary difference between non-
profit corporations and for-profit corporations lies in the nondistribution constraint
which prohibits a nonprofit corporation from paying dividends or otherwise distribut-
ing any part of its net income or earnings to persons involved in the organization. See
id. § 13.01. This contrasts with a for-profit corporation which is owned by its share-
holders who share in the profits and losses of the corporation and maintain control
over the corporation through their reserved powers and the board of directors they
elect. The control of a nonprofit corporation is vested in its members through their
reserved powers and the board of directors they choose or through the sole govern-
ance of a self-perpetuating board of directors. In either type of corporation, the
boards of directors have analogous duties, whether the beneficiaries are the share-
holders or the public-at-large.
24. See HOWARD L. OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND
ASSOCIATIONS § 265 (5th ed. 1988).
25. See RMNCA, supra note 20, § 8.30(a).
26. See id. § 8.30(b).
27. See Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 462 (Del. 1991) (asserting that a court
cannot second guess the wisdom of a facially valid decision made by charitable fiduci-
19981
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sumption that in making a business decision, board members
fulfilled their fiduciary duties of care by making good faith, in-
formed decisions with an honest belief that the action taken was
in the best interests of the company rather than in their own
self-interest. 28 When the business judgment rule applies, the
burden falls on the party challenging the directors' actions to
rebut the presumption that the directors acted in good faith by
proving the board members acted improperly. 29 A party chal-
lenging whether a board has properly discharged its duty of care
must prove that the directors' actions or omissions have risen to
a level akin to gross negligence.3" If the plaintiff is successful,
the burden shifts to the directors to prove they acted with the
requisite degree of care.31 Therefore, although directors may be
held liable for gross negligence in carrying out their duties, they
will not be held liable for mere mistakes or errors in judgment
as long as they acted in good faith.32 It should be noted that the
business judgment rule protects director action and not director
inaction.33 The rule does not protect directors who inattentively
fail to act, but does protect directors who make a conscious deci-
aries); John v. John, 450 N.W.2d 795, 799-800 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that bad
faith, willful abuse of discretion, or fraud is a prerequisite to courts interfering in
corporate affairs); Morris v. Scribner, 508 N.E.2d 136, 139 (N.Y. 1987) (declaring that
the courts should not interfere with the decisions of members of religious corpora-
tions absent dishonest or unfair conduct); Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136
Cal. Rptr. 36, 43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (recognizing that where there is no reasonable
basis for the settlement of a claim, the settlement of such a claim is not the proper
exercise of sound business judgment). The business judgment rule has been described
as both a presumption and a rule of substantive law. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984) (presumption: "presumption that in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action was taken in the best interests of the company"); Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (rule: "court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the board if the latter's decisions can be attributed to any rele-
vant business purpose").
28. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (citing Aronson, 473
A.2d at 812).
29. See id.
30. See id. at 873 (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812). Actual formulations of the
rule may differ across jurisdictions. For a complete discussion on the business judg-
ment rule, see Michael J. Kennedy, The Business Judgment Syllogism - Premises Gov-
erning Board Activity, 985 P.L.I. CoRP. 723, 733 (1997).
31. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873.
32. See id.
33. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 ("Technically, [the business judgment rule] has
no role where directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious
decision, failed to act."); James E. Spiotto, Director and Officer Liability: Who
Watches the Watchmen?, 931 P.L.I. CoRP. 361, 373 (1996).
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sion to refrain from acting in the exercise of valid business
judgment.34
The Delaware Supreme Court case of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 35
while involving the sale of a railroad shipping company, contains
lessons concerning corporate decision-making which are partic-
ularly prescient for health care providers. In Van Gorkom, the
shareholders of Trans Union Corporation brought a class action
lawsuit against the board of directors alleging that the directors
had breached their duties of care by approving a $690 million
merger between Trans Union and a wholly owned subsidiary of
Marmon Group, Inc.36 The plaintiffs attacked the approach
used by the board to reach this fundamental business decision
and argued dereliction of duty by the board.37 Jerome Van
Gorkom, Trans Union's chairman of the board and chief execu-
tive officer, proposed that Marmon Group acquire Trans Union
for fifty-five dollars per share.38 The basis for the price was a
preliminary study performed by Trans Union's chief financial of-
ficer which indicated that a leveraged buyout would be feasible
at fifty dollars per share but difficult at sixty dollars per share.39
Marmon Group agreed to offer fifty-five dollars per share and
the merger was subsequently approved by the Trans Union
board in a two-hour meeting held on one day's notice.40 At the
meeting, Van Gorkom made a twenty-minute presentation and
an attorney stated that the board might be subject to litigation if
the offer was not approved and that a fairness opinion was not
required by law.4' The chief financial officer explained that his
efforts to discover the feasibility of a leveraged buyout did not
constitute an evaluation of the fair price or an estimation of the
value of the company, and that the fifty-five dollars per share
offer was at the low end of the possible price range. 42 The direc-
tors did not inquire as to the basis for determining the merger
price and no explanation was offered.43 Further, although cop-
ies of the proposed merger agreement were distributed at the
meeting, none of the directors had the opportunity to review the
34. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813.
35. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
36. See id. at 863.
37. See id. at 864.
38. See id. at 868.
39. See id. at 869.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 867.
42. See id. at 868-69.
43. See id.
1998]
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documents.44 The Van Gorkom court held that the directors
were grossly negligent and breached their fiduciary duties of
care to the stockholders.45 The directors' decisions were not
protected by the business judgment rule because the directors
did not take the appropriate steps to become informed about
the proposed merger prior to approving it.46
The seminal case addressing directors' fiduciary duties of care
in a nonprofit health care context is Queen of Angels Hospital v.
Younger.47 In Queen of Angels, the hospital's Catholic sponsor
claimed it was owed sixteen million dollars for past services ren-
dered by its Sisters.48 The Queen of Angels board subsequently
executed a settlement agreement with the Catholic sponsor
which provided that the Hospital would pay the sponsor $200
per month for each Sister over the age of seventy, whether or
not she had worked at the Hospital.49 The California Court of
Appeals held that the board of directors of the hospital
breached its fiduciary duty of care when it approved a settle-
ment for claims for which there was no reasonable basis.5 ° The
court reasoned that although the sponsor claimed in good faith
the right to compensation, the board did not properly exercise
its business judgment.5 ' The court explained that the services
rendered by the Sisters were considered by both parties to be
donations and therefore, there was no legal obligation to pay for
the claim.52 Accordingly, the board had no reasonable basis for
believing in the validity of the claim and breached its fiduciary
duty of care by entering into an inappropriate settlement. 3
Van Gorkom and Queen of Angels illustrate that perhaps the
single most important component of board conduct is not the
actual decision that is rendered, but rather, the decision-making
process utilized by the board to reach its decision. The business
judgment rule provides judicial protection where an informed,
appropriate decision-making process is utilized and where the
board's deliberative process is supported by documentation con-
taining the reasons for their decision. The decision-making and
44. See id. at 868.
45. See id. at 864.
46. See id.
47. 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
48. See id. at 39.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 42.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
[Vol. 7
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documentation process must demonstrate that the board exer-
cised due care in following a particular course of action. Boards
should create and retain background memoranda, meeting
notes, minutes, and well-crafted board resolutions for all corpo-
rate actions likely to attract scrutiny. A director may properly
rely on the records of the corporation and other information,
opinions, or reports presented to the corporation by individuals
considered to have professional or expert competence in a par-
ticular area as long as those individuals have been selected with
reasonable care.54
Boards must always encourage active board member partici-
pation in all corporate decisions. The board should hold meet-
ings with prior notice and distribute relevant documents in time
for all board members to acquire available information regard-
ing the proposed action and review the documentation that is
provided. Board leaders must disclose all prior communications
regarding the proposed action, including the deal background.
In order to be fully informed, boards should utilize outside con-
sultants and experts as appropriate, review the proposed trans-
action and agreement terms in detail, engage in thoughtful and
honest discussions, and monitor activities that have been dele-
gated to committees or individual board members. Board mem-
bers must recognize that in satisfying their duties of care, they
must make careful, educated, and honest decisions.
2. The Duty of Loyalty
Integration and consolidation activities are creating additional
pressures on directors to be fastidious in avoiding conflicts of
interest and even the remote appearance of a conflict. The
duty of loyalty requires directors to be disinterested and in-
dependent and act in the best interests of the corporation. 56 The
increasing number of mergers, acquisitions, and conversions to
for-profit status has the potential of creating additional conflicts
as directors may have interests in one or more of the entities
54. See RMNCA, supra note 20, § 8.30(b).
55. For a complete discussion concerning situations involving nonprofit directors'
duties of loyalty, see Michael W. Peregrine, The Nonprofit Board's Duty of Loyalty in
an 'Integrated' World, 29 J. HEALTH & HOsp. L. 211, 211-19 (1996).
56. See RMNCA, supra note 20, § 8.30 n.4; see, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503,
510 (Del. 1939) ("Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their posi-
tion of trust and confidence to further their private interests .... [A]n undivided and
unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between
duty and self-interest.").
1998]
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involved. The duty of loyalty may be compromised whenever a
director has a conflict of interest, derives an improper financial
benefit from a transaction through competing with the corpora-
tion, or usurps a corporate opportunity.5 7
In today's consolidating health care industry, potential con-
flict of interest situations abound. Sometimes the conflict is evi-
dent, such as when a director simultaneously serves on the
boards of two separate nonprofit health care corporations or
when a director procures real property or intellectual property
which the corporation may want to acquire or develop in the
future. 58 Other conflicts, however, are much more subtle. For
example, a conflict may exist when a board member invests in
for-profit corporations which compete with the nonprofit corpo-
ration on whose board he or she serves. Situations in which a
director, who is also a physician, is asked to confront issues such
as physician compensation, 59 the acquisition of other medical
practices, or clinical issues affecting his or her personal practice
may also create a conflict that may violate the director's duty of
loyalty.
The existence of a conflict of interest involving one or more
board members does not necessarily preclude a board from en-
tering into a proposed transaction. In some circumstances, a
conflict may not taint the entire transaction. In determining
whether a particular transaction may be enforced even if a con-
flict exists, courts will examine whether the director disclosed
the conflicting interest and the manner in which other board
members approved the transaction.60 Again, process is crucial.
A conflict of interest or interested-director transaction is revo-
57. See generally DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDU-
CIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 124-51 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1995);
CHARLES HANSEN, A GUIDE TO THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE PROJECT 56-72 (1995).
58. See Peregrine, supra note 55, at 215-16.
59. To prevent "interested physicians" from dominating tax-exempt integrated de-
livery systems' boards of directors, the IRS announced a safe harbor which limited
physician representation on such boards to no more than twenty percent. See William
S. Painter, Recent Legislation, Cases, and Other Developments Affecting Healthcare
Providers and Integrated Delivery Systems, SB51 A.L.I-A.B.A. 100, 127 (1997). How-
ever, in 1996, the IRS shifted away from its emphasis on the twenty percent limitation
of physician representation to a more flexible approach. See id. The new position
states that tax-exempt hospitals will not jeopardize their exemption even if physician
representation on the board is more than twenty percent as long as a majority of the
voting members of the board comprise independent community members and the
organization adopts a substantial conflicts of interest policy. See id.
60. See RMNCA, supra note 20, § 8.31; Peregrine, supra note 55, at 213.
[Vol. 7
10
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 7 [1998], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol7/iss1/6
Boards Of Directors Under Fire
cable unless the transaction is (1) approved or ratified by disin-
terested members of the board, a committee of the board, or
disinterested members of the corporation who, after full disclo-
sure, reasonably believe that the transaction is fair to the corpo-
ration, (2) approved by the state attorney general, or (3)
validated by a court in an action in which the attorney general is
joined as a party.61
In addition to avoiding conflicts of interest, the duty of loyalty
prohibits board members from usurping corporate opportuni-
ties. The usurpation of a corporate opportunity occurs when a
director takes advantage of his or her position as a director by
capitalizing on a business opportunity that properly belongs to
the corporation.62 An opportunity is a "corporate opportunity"
if the corporation is financially able to undertake it, if the op-
portunity relates to the corporation's line of business, if the cor-
poration has a reasonable business expectancy in the
opportunity, and if by appropriating the opportunity, the direc-
tor's interest will conflict with the interests of the corporation.63
If an opportunity is considered a "corporate opportunity," the
director must follow specific procedures before pursuing it. In
order to take any action on his or her own behalf, the director
must make full disclosure of the business opportunity to the
board and request that the board make a diligent inquiry as to
whether the corporation is able and willing to pursue it.64 In
other words, if the opportunity is considered a corporate oppor-
tunity, the director must disclose the business opportunity and
wait for the corporation to reject it before appropriating it for
himself.
The seminal case discussing nonprofit boards' fiduciary duties
of loyalty is Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School
for Deaconesses & Missionaries.65  In Stern, the plaintiffs
brought a class action lawsuit alleging that individual members
of the board of directors of a hospital breached their fiduciary
61. See RMNCA, supra note 20, § 8.31(b).
62. See Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
63. See id. at 511. See generally Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New
Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1031-33 (1981) (discussing
the issue of whether a business opportunity properly belongs to a corporation).
64. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 5 (1994).
65. 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974).
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duties of loyalty by mismanaging hospital funds.66 The allega-
tions were supported by evidence which demonstrated the direc-
tors failed to disclose their individual interests in transactions in
which board members deposited hospital funds in non-interest
bearing accounts at financial institutions in which the directors
had interests.67 Further, the evidence indicated the directors
failed to pursue investments with institutions which maintained
superior terms in favor of those institutions in which they had
interests. 68  The directors also failed to follow the hospital
board's conflicts of interest policy. 69 Consequently, the District
Court for the District of Columbia held that the directors
breached their duties of loyalty because they were grossly negli-
gent in failing to properly supervise the company's investments
and engaging in self-dealing transactions.7 ° The court reasoned
that although the noninterested directors may be assumed to
have been aware of the various bank affiliations of the defend-
ants, the defendants did not alert the noninterested directors to
the conflicting interests prior to securing approval of particular
transactions. 71 Therefore, the court held the interested directors
liable for breaches of their fiduciary duties of loyalty to the
corporation.
In light of the tremendous potential for conflicts of interest
arising in a health care environment that is reorganizing and
consolidating, it is vital that directors adhere to their fiduciary
duties of loyalty. A step that all boards must take to ensure
66. See id. at 1007. Plaintiffs also alleged that board members breached their fidu-
ciary duties of care. See id. However, for the purposes of this discussion, only the
fiduciary duty of loyalty allegations will be addressed.
67. See id. at 1016.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 1015. The hospital's conflicts of interest policy was based on guide-
lines issued by the American Hospital Association and included provisions requiring
the disclosure of any possible conflicts of interest on an annual basis or when the
interest becomes a matter of board action, documentation of such disclosure, and
prohibiting that member from voting or using his influence regarding the matter. See
id.
70. See id. at 1015-16. The court also held that the defendant board members
breached their duties of care stating that they "failed to exercise even the most cur-
sory supervision over the handling of Hospital funds and failed to establish and carry
out a defined policy." Id. at 1016. The court reasoned that the defendant board mem-
bers breached their duties of care when they allowed the hospital's finances to be
managed almost exclusively by two of the hospital's officers, the finance and invest-
ment committees did not meet until ten years after their creation, and none of the
directors appointed to the committees ever objected to the absence of meetings. See
id. at 1008, 1015.
71. See id. at 1016.
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compliance with the duty of loyalty is to develop and institute a
substantial conflicts of interest policy. The IRS has issued a
sample conflicts policy for tax-exempt health care organizations,
and boards would be wise to use the sample policy as a guide for
instituting their own.7 2 The sample policy recommends the im-
plementation of particular procedures to address conflicts of in-
terest. First, a director must disclose any potential conflicts of
interest to those members or committees who are considering a
proposed transaction.73 The next step is to determine whether a
conflict exists.7 1 If a conflict does exist, the policy should enun-
ciate standards and procedures to be utilized in addressing ac-
tual or potential conflict situations. The policy should include
provisions requiring appropriate disciplinary or corrective ac-
tion if a member fails to properly disclose an actual or potential
conflict, 76 mandating that certain information regarding the dis-
closure of conflicts of interest be reflected in the board meeting
minutes,77 prohibiting physicians who receive compensation
from the entity from membership on compensation commit-
tees,78 and insisting that board members sign annual statements
indicating that they understand and will comply with the corpo-
ration's conflicts of interest policy. 79
The policy should also address situations in which a conflict is
detected. In the event a conflict exists, the board has several
options. First, the chairperson of the board or committee may
appoint an independent member or committee to investigate al-
ternate courses of action and determine whether a more advan-
tageous arrangement may be obtained from a source which does
not give rise to a conflict of interest.8 0 If there are no feasible
alternative arrangements, the disinterested directors may vote
to determine whether the transaction is in the corporation's best
interests and whether the transaction is fair and reasonable to
the corporation.8 1
72. See Painter, supra note 59, at 163-69.
73. See id. at 165.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 166.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 166-67.
79. See id. at 167.
80. See id. at 165.
81. See id.
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B. The Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2
In addition to directors' fiduciary duties of care and loyalty,
directors of tax-exempt organizations may be held personally li-
able for violations of the tax-exemption requirements. 82 The
IRS has the power to impose different levels of sanctions. First,
the IRS may revoke the entity's tax-exempt status.83 The IRS
has seldom imposed this severe sanction, described by some as
"draconian," because to do so would deprive the community of
much-needed health care services and fail to punish those in-
volved in the improper decision. 4 In 1996, the Taxpayer Bill of
Rights 2 created an alternative to revocation of tax-exempt sta-
tus.8 5 The law authorizes the IRS to impose excise taxes, also
known as intermediate sanctions, on "disqualified persons" and
82. Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code grants particular organizations ex-
emption from federal income tax if they are "organized and operated ... for religious,
charitable, scientific . . . or educational purposes." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West Supp.
1997). There are basically two tests that are employed in determining whether a cor-
poration meets the requirements of § 501(c)(3), the organizational test and the opera-
tional test. In order to satisfy the organizational test, the tax-exempt purposes of the
corporation must be designated in its articles of incorporation or bylaws. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) (as amended in 1990). Health care entities have been permitted
to take advantage of the exemption from federal taxes since the promotion of health
has long been considered a charitable purpose. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
The operational test examines the manner in which the corporation actually functions
and requires that the organization be operated primarily for charitable purposes.
There are two elements which must be scrutinized in determining whether the opera-
tional test is satisfied, private benefit and private inurement. The first, private benefit,
requires that the corporation serve a public rather than a private interest. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1990). In other words, any benefit to an indi-
vidual or entity must be incidental to the greater public benefit. See id. In making
such a determination, the Service will weigh the relevant facts and circumstances of
each case. See id. Two tests have been formulated to ascertain whether the private
interests in a transaction are served no more than incidentally, the qualitative test and
the quantitative test. See id. The qualitative test asks whether the private benefit is a
necessary concomitant to achieve a public benefit. See id. The quantitative test in-
quires whether the private benefit is quantitatively incidental to the public benefit.
See id. The second part of the operational test, private inurement, requires that no
person having the ability to influence the decisions of an exempt organization receive
any portion of the net earnings of the corporation. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2)
(as amended in 1990).
83. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (as amended in 1990).
84. See Barbara J. Calderone, Taxpayers' Bill of Rights 2: Making Sense of the
Sanctions, 30 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 61, 71 (1997); Lawrence E. Singer, The Conver-
sion Conundrum: The State and Federal Response to Hospitals' Change in Charitable
Status, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 221, 247 (1997); Douglas M. Mancino, New 'Intermediate
Sanctions' May Cause Public Charities to Change the Way They Do Business, 85 J.
TAX'N 368, 373 (1996).
85. See Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, §§ 1311-14, 110 Stat. 1452,
1475-81 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (1996)).
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organization managers who engage in "excess benefit transac-
tions. ' 86 "Excess benefit transactions" are transactions in which
a tax-exempt organization provides an economic benefit to a
disqualified person and the value of the benefit provided ex-
ceeds the consideration received by the organization.8 7 A "dis-
qualified person" is one who has a substantial interest in the
corporation or who is able to substantially influence the affairs
of the corporation.8 Disqualified persons may include persons
such as key doctors,8 9 officers and directors who are in a position
to exercise substantial influence over the corporation, 90 and in-
dividuals who have authority or responsibility similar to that of
an officer, director, or trustee. 91
A disqualified person who has benefited from an excess bene-
fit transaction will be assessed a tax in an amount equal to
twenty-five percent of the excess benefit. 92 If the disqualified
person does not correct the excess benefit transaction within the
taxable period, an additional tax equal to two hundred percent
of the excess benefit will be assessed.93 Further, organization
managers who participate in excess benefit transactions are sub-
ject to a tax equal to ten percent of the excess benefit, unless the
managers' involvement is not willful and is due to reasonable
cause.
94
Excess benefit transactions may arise in a variety of situa-
tions. Virtually any situation in which an individual who sub-
stantially influences the affairs of the corporation makes or
receives a payment that cannot be supported by an independent
appraisal or which is unreasonable because it exceeds fair mar-
86. Id.
87. See id. at 1476 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A)).
88. See id. at 1477 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 4958(f)(1)).
89. See H.R. 506, 104th Cong., 58 n.1 (1996). Under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2,
physicians will not automatically be deemed disqualified persons based on their status
as medical staff members. See id. This view is a departure from the one previously
expressed by the IRS. In 1986, the IRS had indicated that it believed employed physi-
cians or physicians who had a close professional relationship with an organization had
a personal and private interest in the activities of the organization and thus, were
subject to the private inurement proscription. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498 (Apr. 24,
1986).
90. See H.R. 506, 104th Cong., 58 n.10 (1996). Directors may not be in a position
to exercise substantial control over the organization in cases where they are part of a
large board. See id.
91. See Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1311, 110 Stat. 1452, 1475
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 4958(f)(2)).
92. See id. at 1475 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 4958(a)(1)).
93. See id. at 1476 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 4958(b)).
94. See id. at 1475-76 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 4958(a)(2)).
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ket value is suspect. For example, if a nonprofit hospital ac-
quires a medical practice and the purchase price exceeds the fair
market value for that type of practice, the physicians and man-
agers who are involved in the transaction may be subject to ex-
cess benefit taxes. Further, if a physician renders medical care
services or consulting services and the total compensation paid
for those services surpasses the reasonable prevailing market
rate, a tax may be levied against both the physician and manag-
ers who knowingly approved an improper transaction.95
An interesting caveat to the penalties imposed pursuant to the
Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 is the effect of directors' and officers'
("D & 0") liability insurance on the payment of intermediate
sanctions. Although corporations may purchase D & 0 insur-
ance policies to cover liability in cases in which a tax is levied,
the payment of a tax or the insurance premium must be consid-
ered in determining the reasonableness of a director's or of-
ficer's compensation package.96 Therefore, the logic behind D
& 0 insurance becomes circuitous when insurance is paid on
behalf of a director or officer whose compensation is already
considered excessive, thereby triggering the payment of another
excess benefit payment which is paid by insurance, triggering
the payment of another excess benefit payment, and so on.97
The legislative history of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 estab-
lishes a rebuttable presumption that a compensation arrange-
ment is reasonable if three criteria are satisfied.98 First, the
compensation agreement must be approved by an uninterested
board or committee composed of individuals unrelated to the
disqualified person. 99 Second, the board or committee must rely
on appropriate comparable data in setting the level of compen-
sation. 100 This requires the board or committee to consider data
such as compensation levels paid for functionally equivalent po-
95. An intriguing situation which has generated considerable discussion in the
health care arena is currently taking place in Birmingham, Alabama. The IRS has
threatened to revoke Baptist Health System's tax-exempt status based on allegations
that it paid more than fair market value when acquiring physician practices. See Mary
Chris Jaklevic, IRS Threatens to Pull Ala. System's Exemption, MOD. HEALTHCARE,
Dec. 22, 1997, at 3. This instance appears to be the first time that an IRS audit has
focused exclusively on an organization's acquisition of physician practices. See id.
96. See Gerald M. Griffith, Analysis and Perspective, 5 Health L. Rep. (BNA)
1759 (Dec. 5, 1996).
97. See id.
98. See H.R. 506, 104th Cong., 56-57 (1996).
99. See id.
100. See id.
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sitions by similarly situated organizations, the location of the or-
ganization, and other reliable information.10 1 Third, the basis
for the board's determination must be adequately docu-
mented. °2 For instance, the minutes of the board or committee
meeting should reflect the board or committee's review of the
individual's qualifications and verify the basis upon which they
relied in determining that the compensation was reasonable.
Because the statute has not yet been applied to the health
care industry, the implications of the intermediate sanctions are
far from clear. The IRS plans to issue proposed regulations re-
lated to health care institutions under the intermediate sanctions
provisions. 10 3 Nevertheless, it is obvious that the sanctions pro-
vide a direct avenue by which individual directors may be held
liable for violations of the tax-exemption laws. In order to pro-
tect themselves, directors must place themselves in a position to
take advantage of the rebuttable presumption of reasonable-
ness. Accordingly, they must fulfill their fiduciary duties by ac-
quiring information about proposed transactions, examining the
available information, and obtaining independent appraisals
concerning the reasonableness of compensation packages. Fur-
ther, detailed board minutes reflecting the disclosure of facts
and circumstances of conflict of interest arrangements and the
board's rationale for entering into particular transactions are
crucial to avoid the imposition of excess benefit penalties.
II. EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
The development and implementation of compliance pro-
grams is a topic which merits specific mention. Compliance pro-
grams are plans instituted by or imposed on organizations for
the purpose of preventing and detecting violations of state and
federal anti-fraud laws. 1°4 United States Attorney General Ja-
net Reno has asserted that the eradication of health care fraud is
one of the top enforcement priorities of the Clinton Administra-
tion.105 In keeping with this theme, the government has in-
101. See Calderone, supra note 84, at 61.
102. See H.R. 506, 104th Cong., 56-57 (1996).
103. See Taxation: Precedential Guidance, Federal Court Actions Among 'Coming
Attractions,' IRS Official Says, 7 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 392, 393 (Mar. 5, 1998).
104. Numerous consultants have developed and are marketing compliance
programs.
105. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE HEALTH CARE FRAUD RE-
PORT, FISCAL YEAR 1994, Introduction, § III (A)(1) (Mar. 2, 1995).
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creased its investigations of health care fraud and rigorous
enforcement efforts are sure to continue. 10 6
A. Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation
In examining boards of directors' fiduciary duties in the com-
pliance context, board members should be especially mindful of
acting in good faith to assure that adequate corporate informa-
tion and reporting systems exist. An effective compliance pro-
gram involves all layers of the organization and adheres to the
organization's purpose, mission, and values. The lessons learned
from In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation10 7
are particularly instructive in this regard.
In Caremark, several stockholders filed derivative lawsuits
against Caremark directors alleging the directors breached their
fiduciary duties of care to the corporation.1 °8 These allegations
arose during the time period coinciding with federal indictments
charging Caremark and its directors with various criminal viola-
tions based on the alleged payment of remuneration to induce
the referral of Medicare or Medicaid patients in violation of
Medicare's anti-kickback law.109 The Delaware Court of Chan-
cery applied the business judgment rule and found that the di-
rectors did not violate their fiduciary duties of care because the
directors acted in good faith, expended reasonable efforts in the
exercise of their monitoring responsibilities, and there was no
knowing violation of the law. n0 Although no directors were
found individually liable for breach of their fiduciary duties, the
court concluded that boards, in order to satisfy their duties of
care, must ensure that adequate information and reporting sys-
tems exist to assure that accurate and timely information is
brought to their attention to allow them to reach informed judg-
ments."1 Under Caremark, directors may be held personally li-
able for losses caused by a breach of the duty of care either by
106. See Thomas E. Bartrum & L. Edward Bryant, Jr., The Brave New World of
Health Care Compliance Programs, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 51-52 (1997) (offering sta-
tistics related to the government's success in prosecuting health care fraud).
107. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)
108. See id. at 964.
109. See id. at 963-64.
110. See id. at 967-72.
111. See id. at 969-70. The Caremark court clarified the holding in Graham v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) in which the Delaware
Supreme Court stated "absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors
to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which
they have no reason to suspect exists."
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failing to maintain reasonable information and reporting sys-
tems, or by failing to monitor and improve suspect practices
which have been brought to their attention.11 2
B. The United States Sentencing Guidelines and Requirements
for Effective Compliance Programs
The holding in Caremark is enhanced by provisions contained
in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Those provisions
offer significant penalty mitigation to corporations convicted of
crime, that have effective compliance programs in place. 3 The
hallmark of an acceptable compliance program is that it "gener-
ally will be effective in preventing and detecting criminal
conduct."'1 4
The ability of health care organizations to develop and imple-
ment effective compliance programs will be critical in insulating
those organizations from harsh criminal sanctions. Despite the
identification of the importance of compliance programs in all
health care organizations, the Officer of Inspector General of
the Department of Health and Human Services ("OIG") has
only developed a Model Compliance Program for Clinical Labo-
ratories." 5 Therefore, no definitive governmental guidelines
have been promulgated which specify the factors necessary for
effective health care compliance programs." 6 However, in
structuring a compliance program, boards of directors may look
112. See Richard S. Gruner, Director and Officer Liability for Defective Compli-
ance Systems: Caremark and Beyond, 995 P.L.I. CORP. 57, 68 (1997).
113. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supra note 5, § 8C2.5(f). The
organizational sentencing portion of the Guidelines provides:
If the offense occurred despite an effective program to prevent and detect
violations of law, [a reduced fine will be levied]....
Provided, that this subsection does not apply to an individual within high-
level personnel of the organization within which the offense was committed
where the unit had 200 or more employees, or an individual responsible for
the administration or enforcement of a program to prevent and detect viola-
tions of law participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the of-
fense. Participation of an individual within substantial authority personnel
in an offense results in a rebuttable presumption that the organization did
not have an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law.
Id.
114. Id. § 8A1.2(k).
115. See OIG Model Compliance Plan for Clinical Laboratories, 62 Fed. Reg.
9435 (1997).
116. The Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General
is currently attempting to develop a model compliance plan for hospitals. See HHS
Reworking Model Compliance Plan for Hospitals After Industry Feedback, Health
Care Daily (BNA) D4 (Oct. 6, 1997), available in Westlaw, BNA-HCD File.
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to the minimum requirements of an effective program as listed
in the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines for the
Sentencing of Organizations, 117 the Model Compliance Plan for
Clinical Laboratories which was released in 1997,118 and corpo-
rate integrity agreements entered into by the GIG with entities
that were alleged to have violated fraud and abuse laws. 19
Although a detailed discussion regarding the requirements of
an effective compliance program is outside the scope of this arti-
cle, the minimum requirements should be mentioned. 120 The
Sentencing Guidelines delineate seven minimum elements
which are essential to a finding that a corporation has instituted
an "effective" compliance program. First, the organization must
have compliance standards and procedures that are "reasonably
capable of reducing the prospect of criminal conduct.' 21 This
requirement prescribes the establishment of a committee com-
prising individuals from various disciplines within the organiza-
tion which is assigned the responsibility of developing the
compliance program. 22 The committee should include legal
counsel to maximize the attorney-client privilege of the commit-
tee's work. 2 3 Further, the committee should assess the legal is-
sues affecting the organization's business and evaluate current
polices to determine whether they satisfy the corporation's
goals. 124
Second, the program must delegate to high-level personnel
the duty to oversee the compliance standards. 125 High-level per-
sonnel refers to "a director; an executive officer; an individual in
charge of a major business or functional unit of the organiza-
117. See id. For a thorough discussion regarding the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines Requirements, see Greg Radinsky, Making Sense of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: How Health Care Corporations Can Manage Risk by Adopting Corporate
Compliance Programs, 30 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 113 (1997).
118. See OIG Model Compliance Plan for Clinical Laboratories, 62 Fed. Reg.
9435.
119. See Radinsky, supra note 117, at 113 n.8. A corporate integrity agreement is
an agreement that a corporation enters into with the OIG in any settlement arising
out of allegations of health care fraud. See HELEN R. TRILLING & JOAN H. KRAUSE,
CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENTS: AN ONGOING RELATIONSHIP WITH OIG
(Oct. 16-18, 1996).
120. For an excellent discussion regarding the development and requirements of
an effective compliance program, see Bartrum & Bryant, supra note 106, at 51.
121. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 8A1.2(k)(1).
122. See Radinsky, supra note 117, at 115.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 8A1.2(k)(2).
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tion," or "an individual with a substantial ownership interest.' '1 26
That individual should periodically report to the board of direc-
tors or its executive committee and be responsible for enforcing
the program consistently.127 Another important responsibility
of the compliance officer is to continuously monitor the pro-
gram's effectiveness by evaluating the program and making nec-
essary adjustments as the business and regulatory environment
changes. 28
Third, the organization must avoid assigning substantial dis-
cretionary authority to individuals who the organization knows,
or should know, have the propensity to engage in illegal activi-
ties. 1 29 This requires the organization to monitor employee per-
formance and develop policies to be followed in the case where
an employee is charged with criminal activity that relates to his
or her job responsibilities.130 Fourth, the compliance standards
and procedures must be communicated to all employees and
agents through an effective means, such as the distribution of
training manuals or training programs.' 3'
Fifth, the organization must administer auditing and monitor-
ing activities and implement mechanisms through which em-
ployees can report instances of noncompliance with state and
federal laws. 32 This requirement addresses the inspection and
improvement of performance as well as the determination of
whether the compliance program is being followed. 33 These
functions should be performed regularly by independent audi-
tors who have access to all necessary organization resources.3
Further, the reporting system must be available to all employees
and may be anonymous, such as through a hotline, a mail drop,
or an ombudsperson1 35
Sixth, the organization must enforce its compliance standards
consistently and implement "appropriate disciplinary mecha-
nisms" for violations of the compliance program. 36 This means
that when a violation of the program occurs, the violation must
126. See Radinsky, supra note 117, at 115.
127. See id. at 115-16.
128. See id.
129. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 8A1.2(k)(3).
130. See Radinsky, supra note 117, at 116.
131. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 8A1.2(k)(4).
132. See id. § 8A1.2(k)(5).
133. See Radinsky, supra note 117, at 116.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 116-17.
136. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 8A1.2(k)(6).
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be treated promptly, effectively, and consistently, with all levels
of employees being treated in a comparable manner for similar
violations. 37 Finally, if a violation of state or federal law occurs,
the organization must take "all reasonable steps to respond ap-
propriately to the offense and to prevent further similar of-
fenses." 138 This requirement demonstrates the need for the
implementation of reporting and disciplinary procedures which
must be followed when violations occur. Further, it suggests
that the organization should be especially conscious of areas in
which misconduct has occurred in the past. 39
The OIG's Model Compliance Plan for Clinical Laboratories
expands upon the seven elements enumerated above and tailors
them to use in a clinical laboratory setting.140 Notable features
of the plan include the following: (1) the requirement that spe-
cific policies concerning designated areas of potential fraud,
such as billing, marketing, and claims processing, be written and
distributed to organization employees; (2) the use of adherence
to the compliance program as a factor in evaluating supervisors
or managers; and (3) the adoption of requirements applicable to
record creation and retention.14
The corporate integrity agreements between the OIG and or-
ganizations that have been investigated for fraud and abuse dis-
play the onerous requirements that the government will impose
on entities alleged to have violated federal laws and demon-
strate the specificity required in developing an acceptable com-
pliance program.142 In addition to the payment of large civil or
criminal fines, the Department of Health and Human Services
has required health care organizations to prepare an annual re-
port to be submitted to the Department, perform an annual au-
dit for all services provided for which claims for government
payments are made, establish new ordering and billing proce-
dures, develop educational programs for employees, voluntarily
disclose misconduct, allow the Department to examine the or-
137. See Radinsky, supra note 117, at 117.
138. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 8A1.2(k)(7).
139. See Radinsky, supra note 117, at 117.
140. See OIG Model Compliance Plan for Clinical Laboratories, 62 Fed. Reg.
9435.
141. See id.
142. The Attorney General has directed that every settlement entered into by the
Department of Justice and the OIG for health care fraud must contain provisions
addressing government-supervised corporate integrity agreements. See Bartrum &
Bryant, supra note 106, at 55.
[Vol. 7
22
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 7 [1998], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol7/iss1/6
Boards Of Directors Under Fire
ganization's records at any time without prior notice, and pro-
vide payment for subsequent government investigations. 143
The court in Caremark did not make any sweeping changes to
corporate law. 144 However, the court explicitly addressed the is-
sue of corporate directors' potential liability for failing to ade-
quately monitor a corporation's activities and illustrates the
demanding standards that may be imposed on boards of direc-
tors of health care organizations. The necessity for the develop-
ment and implementation of effective compliance systems was
reinforced by the United States Sentencing Guidelines and vari-
ous corporate integrity agreements derived from settlements be-
tween health care organizations and the government. The
essence of these authorities is that in monitoring a health care
corporation's activities, the board of directors must keep in-
formed of the organization's affairs and institute an effective,
dynamic monitoring system designed expressly for the particular
organization that takes into consideration the organization's
unique purpose, the applicable laws, and involves the entire
organization.
III. NONPROFIT CONVERSIONS
In recent years, the hospital industry has undergone a meta-
morphosis from domination by a nonprofit delivery model to an
industry in which certain markets are controlled by for-profit
providers.145 The integration of health care services has gener-
ated an increase in transactions involving for-profit organiza-
143. See, e.g., Radinsky, supra note 117, at 113 n.8 (mentioning the SmithKline
Beecham Clinical Laboratory's corporate integrity agreement with the OIG); TRIL-
LING & KRAUSE, supra note 119; California Lab to Pay $5.2 Million to Settle Medicare
Fraud Charges, Health Care Daily (BNA) D8 (Feb. 18, 1997), available in Westlaw,
BNA-HCD File (reporting particular provisions contained in the corporate integrity
agreement included in Meris Laboratory, Inc.'s settlement with the Department of
Justice); Spectra Labs to Pay $10 Million, Enters Corporate Integrity Program, Health
Care Daily (BNA) D2 (Dec. 24, 1996), available in Westlaw, BNA-HCD File (listing
the requirements of Spectra's corporate integrity agreement).
144. See Stephen F. Funk, Comment, Recent Development in Delaware Corporate
Law: In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation: Director Behavior,
Shareholder Protection, and Corporate Legal Compliance, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 311,
321-22 (1997).
145. See Ron Winslow & George Anders, Not-for-Profit Hospitals Tempt Public
Concerns: Many Are Takeover Targets as Nation's Big Chains Seek Ways to Expand,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1994, at A2. See generally Linda B. Miller, The Conversion
Game: High Stakes, Few Rules; A Close Observer of Scores of Hospital Conversions
Asks, "Who Really Benefits From These Deals?, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 112
(discussing the need for studies focused on nonprofit conversions and the impact of
the transactions on affected communities).
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tions acquiring or affiliating with nonprofit organizations. 146
Although transactions involving both nonprofit and for-profit
entities are often controversial, sometimes there are strong in-
centives for nonprofit entities to enter into such transactions.
Two of the most prevalent incentives are that entering into a
transaction with a for-profit entity provides immediate access to
capital 147 and affiliation enhances the nonprofit organization's
ability to secure essential managed care contracts.14  Nonprofit
to for-profit transactions raise a myriad of issues which must be
carefully addressed by the boards of directors of the organiza-
tions involved. 149 When faced with a nonprofit to for-profit con-
version, directors must consider their fiduciary obligations, laws
regulating charitable trusts, and state and federal laws regulating
charitable organizations.
A. Fiduciary Duties
The starting point for any significant business transaction is
that directors must always fulfill their fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty. In satisfying their duties of care, each director must
determine in good faith whether a particular transaction allows
the entity's assets to be used for the charitable purposes stated
in the organization's articles of incorporation and serves the best
interests of the corporation and the community. 150 Further, di-
rectors must ensure that they discharge their duties of care by
maximizing the value of the nonprofit's assets to assure that a
particular transaction continues to satisfy the charitable pur-
poses of the organization and protect the interests of the com-
munity.' 5 1  In making these determinations, the board must
scrutinize all available information, conduct independent studies
146. See Singer, supra note 84, at 221-22; Tower, supra note 17, at 157.
147. See Gary Claxton et al., Public Policy Issues in Nonprofit Conversions: An
Overview: Does Ownership Status of Hospitals and Health Plans Make a Difference?
A Review of Conversion Activity Raises Questions for Public Debate, HEALTH AFF.,
Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 9, 13.
148. See Julie Marquis, Report on Hospital Sale Gives Both Sides Fodder; Health:
If For-Profit Firm Buys Queen of Angels, It Will Likely Halt Money-Losing Services,
Study Says, But Could Land Coveted HMO Contracts, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1998, at
B3.
149. For an in depth discussion concerning the diverse state laws that apply to
nonprofit conversions, see Donald Shriber, State Experience in Regulating a Changing
Health Care System: The Differing Politics, Experience, and Legislative Backdrops in
States Around the Country Lead to Substantial Variation When It Comes to Regulating
Nonprofit Conversions, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 48.
150. See supra notes 25-54 and accompanying text.
151. See Claxton et al., supra note 147, at 21-23; Tower, supra note 17, at 157.
[Vol. 7
24
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 7 [1998], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol7/iss1/6
Boards Of Directors Under Fire
to ensure that the full value of the corporation is realized, utilize
the knowledge of independent experts, engage in honest discus-
sions concerning the effect of the proposed transaction, and doc-
ument the basis for their decisions.
The directors must also ensure that they comply with their
duties of loyalty by acting in the best interests of the corporation
and refraining from acting in their own best interests. 52 A few
duty of loyalty problems that may arise in the conversion con-
text include an offer of employment or financial incentives to
officers or directors upon consummation of the transaction 153 or
a sale of all a charitable nonprofit's assets to a for-profit corpo-
ration controlled by the nonprofit's board of directors. 154 In or-
der to fulfill their fiduciary duties of loyalty to the corporation,
board members must give particular care to clarifying the roles
of the chief executive officer, the executive staff, and board
members after a transaction is completed. Directors should
avoid the appearance of impropriety and assure that any poten-
tial or actual conflicts of interest are disclosed and addressed
through the corporation's conflicts of interest procedures. 55
B. Charitable Trust
Another area that must be examined in a sale by a nonprofit
entity to a for-profit entity is the law of charitable trust. The
assets of nonprofit health care organizations are governed by
state charitable trust laws which generally require that a non-
profit corporation be under the same duty as a charitable trust
to devote its assets to specified charitable purposes. 56 Usually,
the charitable purposes are designated in the corporation's char-
152. See supra notes 55-81 and accompanying text.
153. See Ethics and the CEO, Hosp. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Jan. 20, 1998, at 28-
32, 34. On October 13, 1997, the governor of California signed legislation prohibiting
directors and officers of nonprofit health facilities negotiating a sale or transfer with a
for-profit facility from receiving compensation after the sale or transfer, unless the
board members are physicians or health care providers who have provided direct pa-
tient care services. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1260 (West Supp. 1998).
154. See James F. Peltz, Lawmakers' Plans Could Make HMO Buyout Costly,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at 9A.
155. See Judith Bell et al., The Preservation of Charitable Health Care Assets: Key
Points that Can Make or Break the Conversion Process from the Community's Perspec-
tive, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 125.
156. See Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 39 (Cal. Ct. App.
1977) (citing Pacific Home v. County of Los Angeles, 41 Cal. 2d 844, 852 (1953));
ScoTT & FRATCHER, supra note 9, § 348.1; Fishman, supra note 21, at 649-50.
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ter or are specified at the time the assets are donated.157 The
charitable trust doctrine requires that when a charitable organi-
zation seeks to convert to for-profit status, the organization
must ensure that the assets it accrued while serving as a charity
will be used to carry on the charitable purposes of the
organization. 158
A leading case involving the application of charitable trust
law in the health care arena is Queen of Angels Hospital v.
Younger.159 In Queen of Angels, the Queen of Angels Hospital,
a nonprofit corporation, sought to lease its hospital facilities to a
for-profit hospital corporation and apply the proceeds not to the
operation of the hospital, but to the establishment and mainte-
nance of outpatient medical clinics to serve the indigent commu-
nity. 160 The attorney general challenged the board's decision
and contended that the use of the assets in the operation of the
clinics "would constitute an abandonment of Queen's primary
charitable purpose and a diversion of charitable trust assets.' ' 61
The California Court of Appeals, in examining the claim,
looked to the hospital's articles of incorporation and noted that
the articles contained several corporate purposes, including the
establishment, ownership, maintenance, and operation of a hos-
pital in the city of Los Angeles. 162 The court evaluated Califor-
nia charitable trust law and determined that "although Queen is
entitled to do many things besides operation of hospital, essen-
tial to all those other activities is the continued operation of a
157. See Queen of Angels Hosp., 136 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (citing Pacific Home, 41 Cal.
2d at 852); see also Robert A. Boisture & Douglas A. Varley, State Attorneys Gener-
als' Legal Authority to Police the Sale of Nonprofit Hospitals and HMOs, 13 EXEMPT.
ORG. TAX. REV. 227 (1996). Where it has become impossible or impracticable to
fulfill the settlor's specific intent, courts may utilize a doctrine known as cy pres to
prevent a charitable trust from failing. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399
(1959). The cy pres doctrine allows a court to circumvent the settlor's exact intention
by permitting the application of trust assets in a manner that is consistent with the
general purposes of the testator, carrying out the settlor's intent "as nearly as" possi-
ble. See id.
158. See Queen of Angels Hosp., 136 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (citing Pacific Home, 41 Cal.
2d at 852). The Restatement (Second) of Trusts defines a charitable trust as "a fiduci-
ary relationship with respect to property arising as a result of a manifestation of an
intention to create it, and subjecting the person by whom the property is held to
equitable duties to deal with the property for a charitable purpose." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 372 (1959).
159. 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
160. See id. at 39.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 40.
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hospital." '163 The court concluded that the corporation's primary
purpose was the operation of a hospital, and therefore, the cor-
poration could not, consistent with the trust imposed upon it,
abandon those operations in favor of the operation of outpatient
clinics. 164
A recent case that addresses both the fiduciary duties of di-
rectors as well as the charitable trust doctrine is Kelley v. Michi-
gan Affiliated Healthcare Systems, Inc.165  The underlying
transaction in Kelley involved a joint venture between a non-
profit hospital, Michigan Affiliated Healthcare System, Inc.
("MAHSI"), and a for-profit organization, Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corporation. 166 The partnership required MAHSI
to provide a majority of its assets to the venture in exchange for
cash and a limited partnership interest.167 The attorney general
sought to block the venture based in part on allegations that the
transaction violated charitable trust law and that the directors
breached their fiduciary duties of care. 68
The Michigan Court of Claims granted summary judgment
motions in favor of the attorney general on the charitable trust
allegations, reasoning that the venture constituted an abandon-
ment of MAHSI's charitable purpose. 169 The court explained
that the process of taking assets from the nonprofit organization
and allowing those assets to be used to generate benefits for the
for-profit entity was not permissible under the applicable state
law.17 0 The court ruled against the attorney general on the
breach of fiduciary duty allegations, explaining that the board
fulfilled its responsibilities by performing due diligence and by
acting with the requisite degree of care. 171
Similar challenges to board decision-making have been
mounted in several other states. In California, for example, the
attorney general contested a joint venture between Sharp
Health Care and Columbia/HCA based on violations of charita-
163. See id.
164. See id. at 41.
165. Kelley v. Michigan Affiliated Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 96-838-CZ (Mich. Ct.
Cl., Sept. 5, 1996); See Michael W. Peregrine, State Attorneys General Increase En-
forcement of Charitable Trust and Fiduciary Duty Laws, 24 HEALTH L. DIG. 3, 4 n.12
(1996).
166. See Peregrine, supra note 165, at 4.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 5.
170. See id.
171. See id.
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ble trust laws and breaches of the fiduciary duty of care by di-
rectors. 172 Sharp Health Care eventually terminated its joint
venture discussions. 173 In Ohio, the attorney general asserted
similar allegations in contesting the sale of assets of Blue Cross
& Blue Shield Medical Mutual of Ohio to an affiliate of Colum-
bia/HCA 7 1 Medical Mutual ultimately canceled the sale and
entered into an agreement with the Ohio attorney general's of-
fice which requires Medical Mutual to transfer its charitable as-
sets to a private foundation dedicated to preventative health
care for indigent children and adults if the company converts to
for-profit status, is sold, or goes out of business. 75 The Texas
attorney general also attempted to challenge a merger between
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas and Healthcare Services
Corporation based on charitable trust and fiduciary duty laws.1 76
In that case, a judge ruled that Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Texas was not a charity and that the board of directors of the
Texas Blues did not breach its fiduciary duties by entering into
the merger agreement. 7 7 Interestingly, the attorney general in
Florida has recently challenged the validity of the sale of Boca
Raton Community Hospital to a consortium of three nonprofit
hospitals, which demonstrates the application of charitable trust
principles to transactions among nonprofit corporations. 78 The
decision to sell the hospital was ultimately rescinded by the hos-
pital's board of trustees. 179
These examples are indicative of the types of challenges that
may be brought against nonprofit corporations and their boards.
172. See Jeannine Mjoseth, California AG Action Underscores New Aggressiveness
by State Officials, 5 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1683 (Nov. 21, 1996).
173. See Sharp Terminates Planned Joint Venture with Columbia, 6 Health L. Rep.
(BNA) 325 (Feb. 27, 1997).
174. See Ohio AG Files Suit Against Blues, Seeking to Retain Charitable Assets, 5
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1086 (July 18, 1996).
175. See Medical Mutual of Ohio: Reaches Settlement Over Assets, HEALTH LINE
(Dec. 22, 1997).
176. See Judge Clears Way for Proposed Merger of Texas-Illinois Blues, 7 Health
L. Rep. (BNA) 278 (Feb. 19, 1998).
177. See id. The state is currently considering an appeal of the decision. See Ap-
peal Decision Hinges on Final Judgment in Texas-Illinois Blues Merger Litigation, 7
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 585 (Apr. 9, 1998).
178. Butterworth v. Boca Raton Community Hosp., Case No. CL9610191AF (Cir.
Ct. Palm Beach Co., Dec. 2 1996). The attorney general's complaint alleges that the
initial corporate purpose of the community hospital was to operate a community-
based facility and therefore, it would be inconsistent with that intent to sell the hospi-
tal to out-of-town hospital systems. See Peregrine, supra note 165, at 8.
179. See Bruce Jaspen, Board Shelves Plan to Sell Fla. Hospital, MOD. HEALTH-
CARE, Dec. 23, 1996, at 6.
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In order to avoid attorney general challenges to nonprofit to
for-profit transactions, boards must not only adhere to their fi-
duciary duties, but understand and comply with the charitable
trust doctrine.
C. Statutory Responses
Attorneys general in all states are intensifying their efforts to
enforce charitable trust laws and fiduciary duty principles in
nonprofit to for-profit conversions. Some states have enacted
legislation that requires attorney general review as a necessary
prerequisite to the sale of a nonprofit health care organization
to a for-profit organization. 8 °
California, a state that has been particularly aggressive in po-
licing nonprofit conversions, is one of the many states that has
enacted specific statutes governing conversions. California re-
quires that written notice be given to the attorney general prior
to selling, leasing, conveying, exchanging, or otherwise disposing
of all or substantially all of the nonprofit, tax-exempt corpora-
tion's assets."' California law also allows the commissioner of
corporations to block nonprofit health care service plan conver-
sions through the denial of their applications. 82 The statute is
grounded in charitable trust principles and requires that con-
verting entities donate assets equal to the entity's fair market
value to a foundation, overseen by the attorney general, which
will use the assets to serve the health care needs of the people in
California. 183 Further, laws in California require public hearings
and allow regulators who are reviewing proposed conversions to
hire independent experts to assist them in making their
determinations. 184
A debate that is currently receiving considerable media atten-
tion in California involves Tenet Health Care Corporation, the
nation's second largest for-profit hospital company, which is at-
tempting to acquire Queen of Angels' Hollywood Presbyterian
180. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5913 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998); GA. CODE
ANN. § 14-3-1202(g) (1994); Mo. REv. STAT.§ 355.656(7) (Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-2-617(7) (1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-12-02(g) (1997); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 65.534(7) (1996); see also Boisture & Varley, supra note 157, at 227. For an excel-
lent discussion on nonprofit conversions and the regulatory responses thereto, see
Singer, supra note 84, at 221.
181. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5913.
182. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1399.70 (West Supp. 1998).
183. See id.
184. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5916, 5919 (West Supp. 1998); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1399.74 (West Supp. 1998).
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Medical Center, a nonprofit hospital. Queen of Angels cur-
rently provides the majority of its health care services to a com-
munity composed of people who maintain full-time jobs, but
who are unable to obtain health insurance.185 Queen of Angels
has historically provided three times as much charity medical
care as other nonprofit hospitals in the nation. 186
A public meeting concerning the sale was held pursuant to
California law at which numerous concerns were voiced, includ-
ing the inadequacy of provisions addressing the continuation of
the current levels of charity care, the maintenance of particular
health care services such as emergency room and obstetrical
services, and the ability of Tenet to discontinue essential but un-
profitable services. 187 Further complicating the situation is a
lawsuit that has been brought by the medical staff of the hospital
which seeks to remove the directors and replace the current
members with court-appointed receivers. 88 The issue of
whether the Tenet-Queen of Angels agreement adequately pro-
tects the charitable nature of the nonprofit entity is yet to be
resolved. 89 Regardless of the ultimate resolution of the Tenet-
Queen of Angels situation, it is clear that nonprofit conversions
will be scrutinized by state attorneys general to ensure that char-
185. See Jackie Goldberg et al., Protect the Sick at the Economic Bottom; Health
Care: The State Should Stop the Sale of Queen of Angels Hospital, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1,
1998, at M5.
186. See id.
187. See Julie Marquis, Hospital Sale Deal Lambasted; Health: At Public Meeting,
Foes Voice Fear That Queen of Angels' Services Will Be Cut By For-Profit Firm, Which
Says Its Does Not Foresee Doing So, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1998, at B1. For a descrip-
tion of the impact of public disclosure in nonprofit to for-profit conversions, see
Judith Bell et al., supra note 155, at 125. (advocating the use of public hearings prior
to the approval or disapproval of health care organization conversions to allow the
community affected by the change to voice their concerns regarding issues such as the
continued provision of health care services in the community and the adequacy of
valuation methods employed).
188. See Julie Marquis, Debate on Hospital Takeover Escalates; Courts: Suit by
Staff of Catholic-Run Queen of Angels-Hollywood Presbyterian Seeks to Have Board
of Directors Removed After Panel Voices Plans to Sell Nonprofit Facility to Chain,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1997, at B1.
189. Cardinal Roger M. Mahoney, Archbishop of Los Angeles, has formally op-
posed the sale, insisting that his consent is required prior to any sale and stating his
preference for allying Queen of Angels with another Catholic hospital. Los Angeles
Archbishop Formally Opposes Sale of Hospital to Tenet, 7 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 322
(Feb. 26, 1998). In an attempt to circumvent the requirement of obtaining consent
from the archdiocesan bishop, the board of directors of Queen of Angels amended its
bylaws to eliminate the need for such approval. Queen of Angels Board Amends By-
laws to Eliminate Need for Bishop's Approval, 7 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 493 (Mar. 26,
1998).
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itable assets are protected and that nonprofit boards are fulfil-
ling their fiduciary obligations.
IV. CONCLUSION
While board service may never have been more vital to non-
profit health care organizations, the liability exposure has never
been greater. The appropriateness of nonprofit director conduct
is being challenged by attorneys general across the nation. Fur-
ther, the risk of liability to directors of health care organizations
has dramatically increased because of the expansion of non-
profit and for-profit affiliations in recent years and due to the
rigorous enforcement of the federal and state health care laws
by government agencies. The dynamic nature of the health care
environment, combined with the increasing numbers of complex
business transactions, has created new demands on nonprofit
boards. The Caremark case illustrates the necessity of institut-
ing compliance systems which detect and address violations of
state and federal laws. Moreover, the recent availability of in-
termediate sanctions which may be levied against directors for
violations of tax-exemption laws illustrates the expanding liabil-
ity of individual directors. Boards of directors of nonprofit
health care organizations must respond to these changes and ful-
fill their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty by protecting the
corporations and the communities they serve.
There is no single principle that can be pronounced and fol-
lowed which will ensure immunity from fiduciary duty chal-
lenges for members of nonprofit boards of directors. However,
organizations may implement procedures that will limit those in-
stances in which the propriety of directors' actions will be
viewed as suspect and that will assist in protecting boards of di-
rectors from the imposition of liability.
Boards of directors must be vigilant in exercising their fiduci-
ary duties. The application of general corporate law, federal
tax-exemption law, charitable trust law, and state conversion
law to boards of directors' fiduciary duties illustrates the perva-
sive nature of the fiduciary duty doctrines. In recognizing the
importance of their fiduciary duties, the first precept that board
members must follow is that they must consistently fulfill their
obligations to the corporation and the public by acting in good
faith. A showing of good faith should be evidenced by the rou-
tine use of independent directors whose purpose is to ensure
that any action taken by the board is in the corporation's best
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interests. Further, boards should devise and execute an exten-
sive conflicts of interest policy that governs the disclosure and
process used to address directors' conflicts of interest which im-
plicate their duties of loyalty. Another significant element that
boards must recognize is that the decision-making process is
critical. Boards must adhere to particular procedures in approv-
ing any transaction. Prior to making a significant business deci-
sion, boards should insist upon full disclosure of the facts and
circumstances relevant to a complete understanding of the situa-
tion, have time to consider all available information, engage in
complete and candid discussion, solicit the opinions and assess-
ments of unbiased experts, procure the advice of legal and finan-
cial advisors, and provide adequate documentation to support
the deliberative process. Moreover, it is imperative that boards
diligently maintain an understanding of the operations of the
corporation through being involved in the administration and
enforcement of compliance programs.
Developments in the health care industry require sophisti-
cated directors who are able to understand complex legal issues.
Boards must not only comprehend basic corporate law, but also
be cognizant of general laws that govern health care delivery.
Only in meticulously fulfilling their corporate duties will the in-
terests of the board, the organization, and the community be
well served.
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